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HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES BY IDENTIFYING
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND ALLOCATING
FAIR BENEFITS
KRISTEN FARRELL*
INTRODUCTION
Developing countries often serve as desired locales for clinical research. The
last decade witnessed a marked expansion in international health care research,'
especially in clinical drug and vaccine trials funded by sponsors in wealthy
countries and conducted in developing nations.' The target populations for clinical
research in developing countries often have no access to basic health care, lack an
understanding of the research, and are politically powerless.3 Governments of host
nations frequently view clinical research as a way to provide otherwise
unaffordable medical care. The sponsors of the clinical trials gravitate to
developing countries because of lower costs, the prevalence of diseases, and
seemingly limitless numbers of impoverished patients.' Of course, this potentially
exploitative clinical research also serves a valuable purpose because it develops
life-saving and life-improving medications. Moreover, this research may be the
best source of health care available to certain vulnerable populations.
This Comment argues that a cohesive and effective international standard
must be developed to protect and serve vulnerable populations in developing
nations. An effective standard will recognize that potential benefits exist for drug
companies and the people on whom they conduct experiments. On one side,
governments and pharmaceutical companies stand to receive financial benefits and
achieve medical progress. On the other side, developing countries may have
. J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., 2003, Boston
College (Chestnut Hill, MA). Thanks to all the editors of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy for
their hard work on this article.
1. James V. Lavery, Putting International Research Ethics Guidelines to Work for the Benefit of
Developing Countries, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHiCS 319, 320 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries,
Fair Benefits for Research in Developing Countries, 298 Sci. 2133 (2002) [hereinafter Fair Benefits].
4. Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The Pharmaceutical Industry's Responsibility for Protecting Human
Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 67, 85 (2004). Many
host countries lack any regulation on clinical trials. Id.
5. Id at 67.
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
access to health care that would not otherwise be available to them. Part One
examines the potential for exploitation by discussing Pfizer's experiments in
Nigeria and vaccine tests conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in several African
nations. Part Two explores the present standards governing human
experimentation in an international context. Part Three analyzes these standards
and identifies areas for improvement. Based on this analysis, Part Four
recommends an international standard involving a heightened attention to informed
consent, recognition of vulnerable populations, and a fair allocation of benefits.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. 6 illustrates the problems that arise when vulnerable
populations suffer as a result of their participation in clinical research studies. This
case involved clinical tests conducted by Pfizer, the world's largest pharmaceutical
company.7 In the process of developing Trovan, an antibiotic with the potential for
producing $1 billion a year in profits,8 Pfizer seized an opportunity to test the drug
in April 1996. That year, the Nigerian city of Kano suffered through epidemics of
bacterial meningitis, measles, and cholera.9 Six weeks after learning of the
epidemics, a Pfizer medical team set up a treatment center at Kano's Infectious
Disease Hospital.' 0
Prior to clinical testing at Kano, only one child had ever been treated with
Trovan." Animal testing of Trovan demonstrated that it might cause damaging
side effects in children, such as joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth, and liver
damage.' 2 These troubling facts compound the apparent lack of consent on behalf
of the research subjects. Although Pfizer sought permission from the parents of
the children too young to provide consent, few parents read or spoke English.'
3
Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged, Pfizer did not explain "that the proposed treatment
6. 77 F. App'x 48, 51 (2d. Cir. 2003).
7. PFIZER INC.: World's largest, research-based, pharmaceutical company created, BIOTECH
WEEK, May 14, 2003, at 94.
8. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 2002).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id. at *2-3. Plaintiffs further alleged that "Pfizer's sole purpose for traveling to Kano was to
expedite the FDA's approval of Trovan to treat pediatric victims." Id. at *4.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id. at "5.
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was experimental, that [subjects] could refuse it, or that other organizations offered
more conventional treatments at the same site free of charge.'
' 4
Pfizer's medical team left Kano after two weeks and never returned for any
follow-up evaluations. 5 Several Nigerian minors and their guardians brought a
class action suit against Pfizer,' 6 in which they alleged that eleven children died
and a number of others suffered from paralysis, deafness, and blindness from their
treatment with Trovan.17 They alleged violations of the law of nations under the
Nuremberg Code ("Cod"), the Declaration of Helsinki ("Declaration"), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and customary
international law.' 8  Pfizer moved to dismiss the complaint for forum non
conveniens and failure to state a claim.' 9
The U.S. district court granted Pfizer's motion to dismiss, on the conditions
that Pfizer consent to suit and accept process in any action the plaintiffs may file in
Nigeria on the same claims.2 ° On appeal to the U.S. District Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that a parallel action in Zango v. Pfizer
had already been filed and dismissed in Nigeria. 2' The plaintiffs also argued that
in the notice for discontinuance, the Nigerian judge declined jurisdiction "for
personal reasons. 22 The Second Circuit subsequently vacated and remanded the
district court's decision for further proceedings to determine what precipitated the
dismissal in Zango.23
Private pharmaceutical companies are not alone in using developing
countries' vulnerable populations for clinical trials. Between 1994 and 1997, the
CDC and NIH conducted experiments on pregnant women infected with HIV in
Thailand, the Dominican Republic, and several African nations.24  These
experiments were intended to create a more effective way of treating AIDS
14. Id. at *6. Humanitarian organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), also known as
Doctors Without Borders, also set up in Kano to treat the sick. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *6.
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *6.
18. Id. at *1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *38. The other conditions for the dismissal were that Pfizer waive any statute of
limitations defense, Pfizer make available for discovery and for trial-at its own expense-any
documents or witnesses within its control that would be needed for a fair adjudication of the plaintiffs'
claims, and that Pfizer would not act to prevent plaintiffs from returning to the district court if the
Federal High Court in Nigeria declined to accept jurisdiction. Id.
21. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 F. App'x 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id. at 53.
24. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, U.S. AIDS Research Abroad Sets Off Outcry Over Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at Al.
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* 25patients in developing countries. Many African nations, suffering from a
growing AIDS epidemic, permitted the scientists to conduct the "short course"
Zidovudine (AZT) vaccine trials on uninformed and unwilling subjects.26 The
trials tested oral AZT's effectiveness in stopping the transfer of HIV from pregnant
mother to child.27 Together, the CDC and NIH funded testing of more than 17,000
pregnant women, half of whom received only a placebo.28
The subjects of the study understood little about the testing, the effectiveness
and possible dangers of the vaccine, and the nature of a placebo.29 One journalist
detailed the following account of the consent procedure used with Siata Ouattara, a
subject in the study:
Minutes after [Ms. Ouattara] was informed for the first time that she
carried the virus, [the] pregnant woman ... still visibly shaken by the
news, was quickly walked through the details of the tests .... In less
than five minutes, in which the previously unknown concept of a
placebo was briefly mentioned, the session was over, and Ms. Ouattara,
unemployed and illiterate, had agreed to take part in the tests. Asked
what had persuaded her to do so, she responded, "[t]he medical care that
they are promising me."
30
Unemployment and illiteracy are not the only factors that make target groups
vulnerable to exploitative research. In fact, at least one participant in the AZT
trials in Africa even had a degree in law. 31 The researchers never explained to her
that AZT had been discovered prior to these tests to block transmission of the virus
during pregnancy: "I am not sure that I understood all of this so well ... But there
were some medicines that they said might protect the mother and the child, and
they wanted to follow the evolution of my pregnancy and the effectiveness of the
treatment." 32 Urgency also played a part: "At the time they explained this to me, I
asked myself the simple question of whether I had any choice ... As long as there
was a possibility to save my daughter I had to try. 33 Clearly, subjects of these
25. Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical
Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 513, 517 (2002).
26. Id. Participating African countries included Ivory Coast, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa,
Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Michael Brown, Medical Group Condemns US. AIDS
Drug Tests in Africa for Using Placebo, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1997, at A 14.
27. Meier, supra note 25, at 517.
28. Id. at 517-18.
29. See Howard W. French, AIDS Research in Africa: Juggling Risks and Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 1997, at AI; Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance; Finding an Abundance of
Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug Companies Test Offshore to Speed Products to
Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at Al.
30. French, supra note 29, at Al.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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tests are not always deceived or holding false hope; rather, they recognize that
these tests represent their only option for treatment.
In 1998, the CDC abruptly announced the end of its short course AIDS
vaccine research in Africa, citing the adequacy of results obtained from similar
research conducted in Thailand.34 Proponents of these tests argued that critics are
"calling on people's emotions rather than dealing with the facts ... ."35 Supporters
of the trials included NIH head Harold Varmus, CDC head David Satcher, and the
executive director of the World Health Organization Global Program on AIDS,
Michael Merson.36 Helene Gayle, the director of the CDC's National Center for
HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, argued that the women in these tests would not
have access to any effective treatment for HIV outside of these studies.37
Furthermore, cultural relativists argue that to require developing countries to adopt
Western standards of informed consent is "ethical imperialism." 38 Some doctors
from host countries have asserted that "Americans should not impose their
standards of care on developing countries," and that "local health experts,
bioethicists and affected groups are best qualified to judge the risks and benefits of
any medical research. 39
The Abdullahi case and the African trials underscore the legal and ethical
dilemmas attached to clinical trials in developing countries. 40  The Nigerian
children and their parents never provided truly informed consent, but the subjects
of these experiments deserve protection from exploitative studies. Furthermore,
with Western companies and governments funding and benefiting from these
experiments, developing countries become the victim in a parasitic relationship.
The remainder of this Comment examines what measures are currently in place to
protect human subjects of clinical trials in developing countries, followed by
recommendations for what can be done to improve those measures.
34. Joanne Roman, U.S. Medical Research in the Developing World: Ignoring Nuremberg, II
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 447 (2002). The first available results of all the studies were those
from Thailand. Id.
35. Daniel Q. Haney, Out Front: Journal Questions Ethics of Study to Stop Infant AIDS,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 17, 1997.
36. Roman, supra note 34, at 447.
37. Susan Okie, Researchers Assailed for AIDS Studies on Pregnant Women in Third World,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1997, at A 13.
38. E.g., Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research
and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 280 (1997); Lisa H.
Newton, Ethical Imperialism and Informed Consent, IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH,
May-June 1990, at 10.
39. Joseph Saba & Arthur Ammann, Editorial, Drug Tests Offer Hope to Victims, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC/GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 1997, at B7.
40. Mary Pat Flaherty et al, Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas; On Distant Shores, Drug Firms
Avoid Delays-and Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at AI; Sharon LaFraniere et al., The
Dilemma: Submit or Suffer; 'Uninformed Consent' is Rising Ethic of the Drug Test Boom, WASH. POST,
Dec. 19, 2000, at Al.
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II. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEINGS
The plaintiffs in Abdullahi alleged violations of the Code, the Declaration,
and Article 7 of the ICCPR. In addition to the standards mentioned in Abdullahi,
Part Two discusses the guidelines jointly produced by the World Health
Organization's Council for International Organizations of Medical Societies
(CIOMS), as well as the domestic regulations promulgated by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
A. The Nuremberg Code
The Code established the first international principle defining permissible
medical experiments.41 In United States v. Karl Brandt, the Nuremberg Tribunal
("Tribunal") laid out the standards now known as the Nuremberg Code.4 2 Brandt
found several Nazi physicians guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in
the aftermath of World War 11.43 Dr. Karl Brandt led many German doctors in
experiments on otherwise healthy subjects.a  These experiments included
submerging people in freezing water for three hours, injecting subjects with
malaria, and shooting people with poisoned bullets.45 The Tribunal condemned the
acts of the physicians, noting that "in every single instance appearing in the record,
subjects were used who did not consent to the experiments ... it is not even
contended that the subjects occupied the status of volunteers. '"46
The Code ues ten principles to delimit permissible medical experimentation
on human subjects.47 Each principle protects individual rights over researchers'
needs to conduct scientific experiments.4 8 The driving principle of the Code is
informed consent. The first principle of the Code states that "[t]he voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." 49 This principle goes on to
explain what constitutes voluntary consent and is the longest of the ten
provisions.50 Voluntary consent must be obtained "without the intervention" of
"force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
41. Meier, supra note 25, at 523.
42. See 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuemberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
Law No. 10, at 181-82 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1997) (1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg Code].
43. Meier, supra note 25, at 522-23.
44. Id. at 521.
45. Id.
46. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 183.
47. Id. at 181-82.
48. Roman, supra note 34, at 448.
49. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 181.
50. Id. at 181-82.
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coercion ..... ,51 The subject is to be informed of the "methods and means" of the
test and of "all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected .... ,52 A
plain reading of the first principle of the Nuremberg Code reveals it to require a
complete description of the test and untainted and completely voluntary consent. It
requires a "true understanding" of the procedure.
53
Informed consent, however, is not the only precept of the Nuremberg Code.
The majority of the remaining provisions concern the welfare of the research
subject.54 These requirements include the creation of a valid research design
seeking otherwise unobtainable information that is important for the good of
society, the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, the lack of an a priori reason to
believe that death or injury may occur, the determination that benefits outweigh the
possible risks, and the duty of the researcher to terminate the experiment if it "is
likely to result in injury, disability, or death ....
B. The Declaration of Helsinki
The medical community first set forth its own criteria "to provide guidance to
physicians . . . in medical research involving human subjects" with the Helsinki
Declaration. 56 The World Medical Association issued the Declaration in 1964 and
revised it most recently in 2000.57 The Declaration requires informed consent and
places a duty on the physician to "promote and safeguard the health of the
people. 58 The Declaration explains that after ensuring the subject understands the
details of the research, the physician should obtain the subject's "freely-given
consent, preferably in writing." 59 At the least, the Declaration requires that the
consent should be formally documented and witnessed.60  The Declaration
recognizes that some research populations "are vulnerable and need special
protection."6' Particular vulnerabilities are again recognized in Principle Twenty-
Three, which explains that a physician should be cautious when obtaining
51. Id. at 181.
52. Id. at 182.
53. Roman, supra note 34, at 449.
54. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 182. The 9th establishes the right of patients to end
participation at any time during the experiment. Id.
55. Id.
56. 52nd WMA General Assembly, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki, § A. I
(Oct. 2000), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf [hereinafter Declaration]; Kelleher, supra note
4, at 74.
57. Kelleher, supra note 4, at 74.
58. Declaration, supra note 56, at §§ A2, B22-24, B26.
59. Id. § 22.
60. Id.
61. Id. §8.
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informed consent if the subject is in a dependent relationship with the physician. 62
The Declaration also provides that there should be a "reasonable likelihood" that
the research population stands to benefit from the results of the research.63
Furthermore, the Declaration provides for several other layers of protection
from unethical patient exploitation. First, it identifies the need for independent
ethical review committees to ensure "conformity with the laws and regulations of
the country in which the experiment is performed., 64 Part C of the Declaration is
titled, "Additional Principles for Medical Research Combined with Medical
Care. 65  Here, the Declaration distinguishes between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research.66 This section also explains that the physician "may combine
medical research with medical care." 67 However, the Declaration cautions that
when this situation occurs, "additional standards apply to protect the patients who
are research subjects., 6
8
C. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR69 is the only legally binding international treaty concerning
human experimentation.70 In Article 7 of the ICCPR, the United Nations
incorporated the informed consent principle in the context of human
experimentation. 71 Article 7 specifies that "[njo one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall
be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 72
D. WHO-CIOMS Guidelines
In 1982, the World Health Organization and Council for International
Organization of Medical Sciences published the Proposed International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects ("Guidelines"). 7
3
62. Id. § 23.
63. Id. § 19.
64. Id. § 13.
65. Id. §§ 28-32.
66. Id. § 28.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
70. Kelleher, supra note 4, at 73. Ratifying states must comply with the terms of the treaty.
ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 50.
71. See ICCPR, supra note 69, at 175.
72. Id.
73. Council for Int'l Org. of Med. Sci. (CIOMS), in collaboration with the World Health
Organization (WHO), International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human
Subjects (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines].
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They were revised in 1993 and again in 2002 to address current issues, such as the
AIDS epidemic.74 The Guidelines were intended to be a prototype for nations
drafting legislation on human research.75  Under the subtitle "General Ethical
Principles," the Guidelines mandate that "[a]ll research involving human subjects
should be conducted in accordance with three basic ethical principles . . . respect
for persons, beneficence and justice. 7 6
The Guidelines identify pregnant and nursing women, prisoners, children,
and persons with mental or behavioral disorders as vulnerable to nonconsensual
experimentation.77 The General Ethical Principles also explain that the subjects
selected should be the least vulnerable necessary to accomplish the purposes of the
research. 78  Guideline 13 requires special justification for inviting vulnerable
individuals to serve as research subjects.7 9 The commentary to this guideline
defines vulnerable persons as "those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of
protecting their own interests." 80 This may include those who have "insufficient
power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to
protect their own interests.8 1
The Guidelines, like the Declaration, discuss the role of ethical review
boards. Yet where the Declaration suggests that it may be necessary, the
Guidelines mandate an ethical review of human testing. The Guidelines instruct
ethical review boards to approve or reject research protocols before proceeding
with research. 2 Guideline 2 specifies that "[a]ll proposals to conduct research
involving human subjects must be submitted for review of their scientific merit and
ethical acceptability to one or more scientific review and ethical review
committees. 83 This guideline additionally requires that the review committees be
independent of the research team, and whatever financial benefit they receive must
not be contingent on the outcome of their review. 84 Furthermore, the guideline
provides for committee review "as necessary" throughout the course of the
research8 5
74. Id. at 7-10.
75. Meier, supra note 25, at 526-27.
76. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 17.
77. Id. at 64-65, 74.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 64.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Guideline 4 requires individual informed consent for all biomedical research
involving humans.86 The commentary to this guideline goes on to explain what
should be done with respect to the process, language, comprehension,
documentation, and cultural considerations involved with informed consent.
87
Guidelines 5, 6, and 7 also relate to informed consent and discuss essential
information for prospective research subjects, obligations of sponsors and
investigators, and inducement to participate. 8 Continuing to echo the previous
contemplations, these guidelines require that the investigator ensure that the
potential benefits and risks "are reasonably balanced" and "risks are minimized.
8 9
The Guidelines further require:
[b]efore undertaking research in a population or community with limited
resources, the sponsor and the investigator must make every effort to
ensure that: the research is responsive to the health needs and the
priorities of the population or community in which it is to be carried out;
and any intervention or product developed, or knowledge generated,
will be made reasonably available for the benefit of that population or
community. 90
As the commentary explains, this part addresses populations that are
"vulnerable to exploitations by sponsors and investigators from the relatively
wealthy countries and communities." 9' Guideline 10 goes beyond the previous
recognitions of vulnerability to encompass socioeconomic defenselessness.
E. Domestic Regulations of Human Experimentation
Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46, "Protection of Human
Subjects," serves as HHS's ethical guidelines for human experimentation in the
United States.92 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also has regulations
governing human experimentation, and they are substantially similar to the HHS
regulations.93 The FDA regulations apply to all clinical investigations that support
applications for research or marketing permits for products regulated by the
FDA.94 HHS's Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) has the primary
responsibility within the United States government for developing and
implementing the policies, procedures, and regulations to protect human subjects
86. Id. at 32.
87. Id. at 32-34.
88. Id. at 37-46.
89. Id. at 47.
90. Id. at 51.
91. Id.
92. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005).
93. 21 C.F.R. § 50(2005).
94. Id. § 50.1 (2005).
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involved in research sponsored by HHS. 95  The OHRP has set up formal
agreements with more than 4,000 federally funded universities, hospitals, and other
medical research institutions in the United States and abroad.96
Each institution is required to establish one or more institutional review
boards (IRBs). 97 The IRBs "are responsible for ensuring that people who agree to
participate in studies fully understand the nature of the research and willingly
consent to participate., 98  The regulations list seven requirements in. order for
research to be approved.99 These regulations include the minimization of risk,
making risks reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, equitable selection of
subjects, and the pursuit and documentation of informed consent.100
To satisfy informed consent, potential participants are to be given an
explanation of the purposes of the research, the expected duration of their
participation, and a description of the procedure. 01 Researchers are also required
to inform the subject that the study involves research, as well as identify any
procedures which are experimental. 10 2 Furthermore, the subject must be informed
of foreseeable risks and there must be a disclosure of appropriate alternative
procedures and courses of treatment.
10 3
The HHS regulations also specifically address research conducted in foreign
countries.1°4 Section 46 acknowledges that procedures in foreign countries often
differ from those promulgated by HHS.10 5 As an example, the regulation refers to
a "foreign institution which complies with guidelines consistent with [the
Declaration of Helsinki] .. 106 In such a circumstance, as long as a "department
or agency head" decides that the procedures are at least equivalent to HHS's, then
95. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., New Office for Human Research
Protections Created, Dr. Greg Koski Named Director (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter New Office],
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2000pres/20000606.html. The HHS regulations apply to all research
conducted or supported by the federal government. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2004).
96. Id.
97. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(2) (2004).
98. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Protecting Human Research Subjects
(June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Protecting Human Research Subjects], http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2000pres/20000606a.html.
99. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.11 l(a)(1) - (5) (2004).
100. Id. The last two criteria require that, when appropriate, "the research plan makes adequate
provision for monitoring data collected to ensure the safety of subjects" and that "there are adequate
provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data." 45 C.F.R. §§
46.11 l(a)(6) & (7) (2004).
101. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (2004).
102. Id.
103. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(a)(2) & (4) (2004).
104. Id. § 46.101(h) (2004).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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the foreign procedures may be used. 107 OHRP also recognizes the additional
protections needed for vulnerable populations.10 8 In order for an IRB to approve
research on subjects that are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or who are
economically or educationally disadvantaged, additional safeguards must be
included.09
The various guidelines and recommendations governing human
experimentation vary depending on the source. There are certain features,
however, that appear constant. First, every scheme requires that research must
conform to some kind of informed consent principles; participants should generally
be aware of the nature of the trial and be free to choose whether to participate.
Second, all of the schemes include some type of balancing test where the benefits
must outweigh the risks. Finally, minimum standards of care are required and
certain vulnerable populations must be protected.
III. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF GAPS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION STANDARDS
The medical tests conducted by Pfizer and the CDC demonstrate that the
current guidelines for human experimentation are not adequate. This Part
identifies the gaps and problems in the existing regulations in order to offer
potential remedies. Specifically, this section will focus on four areas: informed
consent, the vulnerable patient, benefit analyses, and enforceability." 0
A. Informed Consent
Informed consent must walk the line between being too permissive and being
too strict. The line must balance on either end the danger of threatening individual
autonomy and the danger of restricting medical progress. When addressing
informed consent, the Declaration leans toward being overly permissive, while the
Code is often viewed as too strict. Researchers criticize the Code as "too
uncompromising and too inhospitable to the advancement of science.""' The
107. Id.
108. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (b) (2004).
109. Id.
110. A complete analysis would encompass a number of other areas, but due to space
considerations these four areas are highlighted.
11. Ruth Macklin, Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 235 (George J. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992); see also Kelleher, supra note 4, at 73.
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Declaration, on the other hand, is often criticized for looking at human
experimentation with too much emphasis on scientific progress."1
2
The Code represents a reaction to Nazi Germany's forced human
experimentation" 3 and therefore does not at all emphasize the need for medical
progress. The first principle of the Code makes clear that the focus is on the
voluntariness of the subject. 1 4 This principle explains voluntariness as having the
"legal capacity to give consent" and requires that the person should be "so situated
as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without intervention of any element
of force, fraud, deceit, [or] duress ....115 In focusing so heavily on the necessity
of voluntary consent, the Code does not consider the potential detrimental effect on
medical progress. For instance, requiring all subjects to have the "legal capacity"
to consent removes a large section of potentially helpful medical subjects. Lacking
the "legal capacity" means that children are essentially off-limits to researchers.
Critics of the Code argue that it impedes medical progress because it does not
account for hardship in obtaining informed consent in complicated experiments not
fully understood by patients. 1 6 Furthermore, critics argue that the Code does not
consider cultural variations about what constitutes consent." 7  Some cultures
preserve the roles of decision-making affecting the public good by only allowing
leaders of the community to make or supplement individual consent decisions.'' 8
The Code's rigidity makes it unfavorable in both the medical community and
developing countries. 119
The Declaration represents a reaction to what physicians viewed as the
Code's deficiencies.120 Many physician-researchers believed that the Code was
inapplicable to their own practices and that it only applied to war crimes
committed by pseudo-scientists.12 1 Thus, the Declaration clearly focuses more on
the interests of researchers. The Declaration makes this clear when, before it
mentions the rights or autonomy of human subjects, it focuses on the physician and
112. E.g., David M. Carr, Pfizer's Epidemic: A Need for International Regulation of Human
Experimentation in Developing Countries, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 15, 47 (2003).
113. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS,
supra note I11, at 137-38.
114. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 181.
115. Id.
116. E.g., Carr, supra note 112, at 31.
117. Id.; see also Meier, supra note 25, at 525-26.
118. E. Maxine Ankrah & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Ethical and Legal Considerations of the HIV
Epidemic in Africa, in AIDS IN AFRICA 548 (Max Essex et al. eds., 1994).
119. Carr supra note 112, at 32.
120. George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, Helsinki
and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 122 (1992).
121. David J. Rothman, Bringing Ethics to Human Experimentation: The American Experience, in
RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ETHICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 35-36 (David N. Weisstub ed.,
1998).
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the significance of medical progress. The fourth paragraph of the Declaration
states that "[m]edical progress is based on research which ultimately must rest in
part on experimentation involving human subjects."'' 22 Then, sixteen paragraphs
later, the Declaration states that "subjects must be volunteers and informed
participants in the research project.' ' 23 This separation emphasizes the shifted
focus from the subject's rights in the Code to the recognition of the importance of
medical progress in the Declaration.
Departing from the standard of the Code, the Declaration lightens the
informed consent burden on researchers. The Declaration allows for research on
legally incompetent individuals if consent is obtained from a legally authorized
representative. 24 Furthermore, while the Code does not allow consent resulting
from duress, 25 the Declaration opens the window slightly. According to the
Declaration, consent may be given under duress as long as the consent is "obtained
by a well-informed physician who is not engaged in the investigation and who is
completely independent of [the researcher-subject] relationship."'' 2 6  The
Declaration also waives consent where the "physical/mental condition [of the
subject] that prevents obtaining informed consent is a necessary characteristic of
the research population."' 
27
In some respects, the Declaration also heightens the informed consent
requirements. Unlike the Code, the Declaration states that it is the duty of the
physician to inform the subject of the "aims, methods, sources of funding, any
possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher and the
anticipated benefits . . . of the study."' 28  However, this apparently heightened
requirement is somewhat deceiving. Although this requirement provides more
detail than the Code as to what a subject should know, it fails to require that the
researcher inform the subject that the research is an experiment.' 29 At best, the
122. Declaration, supra note 56, § 4.
123. Id. § 20.
124. Id. § 24.
125. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 181.
126. Declaration, supra note 56, § 23.
127. Id. § 26.
128. Id. § 22.
129. Paragraph 22 of the Declaration of Helsinki provides in full:
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the
aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations
of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort
it may entail. The subject should be informed of the right to abstain from participation in the
study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. After ensuring that
the subject has understood the information, the physician should then obtain the subject's
freely-given consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be obtained in writing, the
non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed. Id.
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information required to be imparted to the subject could result in the inference that
she is participating in an experiment.
David Carr argues that the Declaration leaves open the possibility of
community consent in lieu of individual consent, while the Code and Guidelines
clarify that individual consent is always required. He asserts that a patient may
inadvertently volunteer to be part of a research experiment. 30 According to Carr,
"subjects entering into facilities where medical treatment is being provided to those
in need by charitable organizations could easily mistake the experimental research,
thus disposing of the need for researchers to obtain consent."' 31 This is exactly
what happened when Pfizer went to Kano, Nigeria. i32 Patients were not aware that
they could receive adequate treatment from Doctors Without Borders (MSF),
which was set up adjacent to Pfizer.' 33 Carr argues that the Declaration does not
require individual consent from subjects in a community subscribing to community
consent.'34 Thus, under the Declaration, the Kano researchers may be viewed as
having obtained informed consent because the community consented to the
research. 1
35
The Guidelines take a more balanced approach to informed consent than the
Declaration and the Code. The Guidelines do not banish all experimentation on
the legally incompetent. 36  Rather, they permit "legally authorized
representative[s]" to provide consent on their behalf.137 The Guidelines also allow
for a waiver of informed consent in "uncommon and exceptional" situations.
38
The commentary clarifies that informed consent may be waived when the risks are
minimal and obtaining informed consent makes the research impracticable.
39
Unlike the Declaration, the Guidelines require the subject be informed that she has
been invited to participate in research. 40  Yet, similar to the Declaration, the
Guidelines require disclosure of the purpose of the research and the institutional
affiliation of the researcher.'
4 1
130. Carr, supra note 112, at 34.
131. Id.
132. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 2002).
133. Id.
134. Carr, supra note 112, at 34.
135. Abdullahi, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *3 (noting that Pfizer obtained consent from both
the Nigerian government and the staging hospital's ethics committee permitting the export of Trovan to
Kano).
136. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 32.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. ld. at 37.
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Like both the Code and the Declaration, the Guidelines do not directly
address community consent. However, the commentary to Guideline 4 does
indicate that community consent may play a role in informed consent. 142 The
commentary acknowledges that some cultures only allow researchers to enter their
community or obtain individual consent after the community leader consents.
143
The commentary acknowledges that these customs must be respected but still
requires individual consent to be obtained.144 The HHS regulations also allow for
cultural considerations when addressing research conducted in foreign countries.
145
These regulations, however, are open-ended in terms of what types of policies can
be used in lieu of the HHS regulations.
146
The various schemes governing human experimentation make clear that
effective guidance regarding informed consent must consider a number of factors.
Broadly speaking, the protection of human subjects must be examined in relation
to the interest of medical advancement. Just as informed consent should not be so
strict as to limit medical advancement, it should neither be so loose as to invade
individual autonomy. Also significant is the level at which cultural considerations
come into play. Except for the Code, all of the schemes seem to acknowledge
cultural differences to some extent, but there is no guidance on how to address the
cultural differences. An ideal international standard should recognize varying
consent customs, but also require individual consent. This would simultaneously
respect the foreign culture and not invade individual autonomy.
B. The Vulnerable Patient
Informed consent is not a "one-size-fits-all" concept. Medical research in
developing countries is an issue precisely because their populations are often
vulnerable to exploitation, despite efforts to promote and use informed consent.
147
Therefore, an examination of international guidelines must include an inquiry into
how the various schemes recognize certain vulnerabilities. Again, this must be
done within the balancing framework, with potential exploitation on one side and
halting medical progress on the other.
The Code's strictness and sparseness bar a meaningful consideration of
vulnerability. Although strict requirements may initially seem beneficial to a
vulnerable population, this is not necessarily the case. The first statement of the
Code prohibits use of human subjects where the patients may be under duress or
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(h) (2004).
146. Id. (allowing other protections to supersede those provided by HHS, but failing to explain
which other protections would be appropriate).
147. See supra notes 13-14, 30-33 and accompanying text.
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coercion. 48 These factors implicitly acknowledge the vulnerability of certain
individuals, but nothing expressly recognizes this potential vulnerability. 149 This
omission is dangerous to vulnerable populations because their consent may be
more easily obtained. When a population has no other options for medical
treatment, they may more readily give their informed consent despite the risks.
The Declaration more explicitly acknowledges vulnerability, but it does not
do enough. Paragraph 8 recognizes that "[s]ome research populations are
vulnerable and need special protection."'"5 The Declaration does not anywhere
else use the phrase "vulnerable population," but it does refer to those who are
"legally incompetent, physically or mentally incapable of giving consent."'
' 5 1
Regarding such vulnerabilities, the Declaration requires that the investigator defer
to local law.' 52 Local law in developing countries, however, is not generally going
to be adequate to appropriately address vulnerability concerns.
53
The Guidelines go into more detail about vulnerable populations and
explicitly discuss which populations constitute vulnerable populations. Vulnerable
classes consist of those with "limited capacity or freedom to consent or to decline
consent. They . . . include children, and persons who because of mental or
behavioral disorders are incapable of giving informed consent."' 5 4 Guideline 13
covers "research involving vulnerable persons" and specifies that "special
justification is required for inviting vulnerable individuals to serve as research
subjects and, if they are selected, the means of protecting their rights and welfare
must be strictly applied."'' 55  The comment to Guideline 13 lists a series of
elements constituting special justification:
the research could not be carried out as well with less vulnerable
subjects;
the research is intended to obtain knowledge that will lead to improved
diagnosis prevention or treatment of diseases characteristic of the
vulnerable class;
subjects will be assured reasonable access to any diagnostic, preventive
or therapeutic products that will become available as a consequence of
the research;
the risks will not exceed those associated with routine medical
examination of such persons; and
148. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 181.
149. Id.
150. Declaration, supra note 56, § 8.
151. 1d.§ 24.
152. Id.
153. See Carr, supra note 112, at 42.
154. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 64.
155. Id.
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when prospective subjects are either incompetent or otherwise unable to
give informed consent, their agreement will be supplemented by the
permission of their legal guardians or other appropriate
representatives.' 56
Missing from the definition of vulnerable persons are "populations and
communities with limited resources." '57 The Guidelines do not deem this category
of people "vulnerable." Rather, this class of people is separated from those who
are vulnerable and addressed in Guideline 10. This Guideline requires that to
conduct research in a population with limited resources, the research must be
responsive to the health needs of the population and that any product developed or
knowledge generated will be made available for the benefit of that population.
58
Although Guideline 10 avoids using "vulnerable" to describe populations
with limited resources, the subsequent commentary does not manage the same.
15 9
The commentary explains that "this guideline is concerned with ... communities
in which resources are limited to the extent that they are, or may be, vulnerable to
exploitation by sponsors and investigators from the relatively wealthy countries
and communities."'' 60 There appears to be a disparity, then, between the ways
various classes of vulnerable populations are treated. The vulnerable populations
addressed in Guideline 13 have the extra protection of "special justifications" for
participation in research. 16 ' There is nothing in the Guidelines that explains the
difference between the various classes of vulnerability.
The Declaration also never explicitly identifies populations and communities
with limited resources as vulnerable. 162 In fact, the Declaration's identification of
vulnerable populations resembles the definition in the Guidelines. 63 The omission
of communities with limited resources may be explained away by a lack of
foresight; however, there may be other reasons for the distinction as well. For
instance, the first requirement for special justification under Guideline 13 is that
the research could not be carried out as well with less vulnerable subjects. 64
Applying this standard to developing countries may be harmful. As stated
previously, these medical trials may be certain populations' only available access
156. Id. at 64-65.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 51.
159. Id. at 51-53.
160. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
161. Seeid at 51-53.
162. Declaration, supra note 56, § 8.
163. Both the Helsinki Declaration and the Guidelines focus on groups of people who are legally or
physically incompetent to give consent. Id. at §§ 24-26; Guidelines, supra note 73, at 64.
164. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 64.
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to treatment. 65 Therefore, it may be harmful to require that research be conducted
elsewhere if possible. Ideally, researchers should recognize the benefits their
research may confer to vulnerable populations. If properly regulated, researchers
should not be discouraged from conducting research on vulnerable populations,
but rather, encouraged.
The HHS regulations also identify vulnerable populations, but the regulations
lack the detail of the Guidelines.166 Vulnerable persons under the HHS regulations
may include children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.167 This definition, unlike
the Guidelines, lumps together the economically disadvantaged with those who
may be unable to legally or mentally provide consent.' 68 The HHS regulations are
not specific about how to handle economically or educationally disadvantaged
populations.
The various schemes demonstrate that it is not always clear how to treat
vulnerable populations. This is true for a number of reasons. First, it is not always
evident what classes of people constitute a vulnerable population. Second, once a
vulnerable population is determined, it is not clear which procedures would be the
most appropriate in terms of medical testing. An improved international standard
must distinguish between communities lacking resources and individuals incapable
of providing consent. Incompetence and poverty are not interchangeable.
Distinguishing between these two areas leads to the next step for an improved
international standard that develops appropriate procedures to protect the various
vulnerable populations. Once they are identified, an improved international
standard should require researchers to specify when they are researching a
vulnerable population, thus triggering specific protective guidelines.
C. Benefits
Ultimately, the goal of medical testing is to achieve some type of benefit.
Once an improved standard identifies a vulnerable population, part of protecting
that population includes assuring that some type of benefits accrue to the
population. These benefits encompass profitability, medicines and products, the
advancement of medical knowledge, and improved health. Discussing benefits in
the context of medical testing in developing countries becomes controversial
because their populations are generally not the beneficiaries of medical
advancement.' 69 This contributes to the perception that developing countries are
being exploited to the benefit of the developed world. All of the schemes
165. Supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
166. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2004).
167. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.11 1(a)(3) & (b) (2004).
168. Id.
169. See Fair Benefits, supra note 3, at 2133.
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governing human experimentation address benefits, but how to allocate those
benefits is not apparent.
Unsurprisingly, the Code does not address benefits to any great extent.
170
The sixth principle of the Code requires that the "degree of risk to be taken should
never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be
solved by the experiment."' 7' Benefits are only discussed within this risk/benefit
balancing test. 172 The Code does not consider to whom the benefits will accrue,
but only establishes that "humanitarian importance" outweighs degree of risk.
73
Although this may have adequately addressed the war crimes to which the Code
responds, it is not sufficient for current trends in medical testing.
The Declaration also considers benefits and, unlike the Code, considers the
beneficiaries. The Declaration requires "special attention" for those who will not
personally benefit from the research. 174 This statement implies that the Declaration
acknowledges the potential for exploitation of groups who do not stand to benefit
from the research. The Declaration also provides a cost/benefit provision similar
to the Code's; it specifies that physicians "should cease any investigation if the
risks are found to outweigh the potential benefits."' 7 5 The Declaration does not
discuss, however, whether benefits should ever necessarily accrue to the tested
populations. This gap once again reflects the Declaration's physician-centered
view. 76
The Guidelines discuss this issue in more detail. Guideline 8 states that the
potential benefits and risks of the study must be reasonably balanced and the risks
must be minimized. 177 This Guideline is similar to the benefit considerations of
the Code and Declaration in that it looks at benefits in the context of a cost/benefit
analysis. Furthermore, the purpose of this Guideline is really to minimize risks,
not to ensure benefits. 78  Guideline 10, discussed previously, offers the first
serious look at vulnerable populations as beneficiaries. 179  As discussed, this
170. Nuremberg Code, supra note 42, at 181-82.
171. Id. at 182.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Declaration, supra note 56, at § 8.
175. Id. § 17.
176. See supra note 54. It is also interesting to note that the World Medical Association, which
created the Declaration, lost a great deal of credibility in 1992 when it elected Hans-Joachim Sewering,
a former Nazi physician, as its president. GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE
MARKET 251 (1998). Sewering resigned only after the American Medical Association produced
documents that proved his involvement in the Nazi euthanasia experiments on the mentally ill. S. Con.
Res. 69, 104th Cong. (1996).
177. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 48.
178. Id. at 47-49.
179. Id. at 51.
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Guideline specifies that the research population must benefit from the "product
developed, or knowledge generated."'1
8 0
Ensuring that the host community benefits from the research is not simple, as
the commentary to Guideline 10 makes clear.' 8 ' The commentary explains that
investigating "reasonable availability" should include negotiations with
"representatives of stakeholders in the host country; these include the national
government, the health ministry, local health authorities, and concerned scientific
and ethics groups, as well as representatives of the communities from which
subjects are drawn and non-governmental organizations such as health advocacy
groups."'' 8 2 The commentary further states that if the tested drug proved beneficial
to the subjects, the sponsor should continue to provide it to them after the
conclusion of the study. 183 The Guidelines give a much clearer picture of what it
means to benefit the host population. What is not entirely clear is how to effect the
benefit, and whether the benefit contemplated is even feasible.
The Guidelines' reasonable availability approach is not without its critics.
Critics argue that reasonable availability fails to guarantee that benefits are
distributed fairly, especially when there are large gains to the entities sponsoring
the research, as well as high risks.' 8 4 Furthermore, reasonable availability only
succeeds in Phase III research that produces an effective outcome; it does not apply
to Phase I, Phase II, or unsuccessful Phase III tests.' 8 5  Therefore, reasonable
availability can fail to protect against exploitation.'
8 6
Like the previous governing mechanisms, the HHS regulations also look at
benefit in terms of a cost/benefit analysis. The risks to the subjects are required to
be "reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result." 8 7 The
regulations do not address specific benefits to vulnerable populations.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 51-53.
182. Id. at 52.
183. Id.
184. Fair Benefits, supra note 3, at 2133.
185. Id. A Phase I trial is an initial study to "determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions
of drugs in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and to gain early evidence of
effectiveness; may include healthy participants and/or patients." HIV/AIDS TREATMENT INFO. SERV.,
GLOSSARY OF HIV/AIDS-RELATED TERMS 91 (4th ed. 2002). A Phase 11 trial "involves controlled
clinical studies conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or
indications in patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the common short-
term side effects and risks." Id. A Phase Ill trial involves "[e]xpanded controlled and uncontrolled
trials after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been obtained, and are
intended to gather additional information to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and
provide an adequate basis for physician labeling." Id.
186. Fair Benefits, supra note 3, at 2133.
187. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2) (2004).
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These people are exploited when they reap none of the benefits from the
knowledge they help achieve through their participation in medical research. To
avoid this, it is necessary to formulate a way in which vulnerable populations are
not mere guinea pigs in an experiment, but actual beneficiaries of medical testing.
None of the governing schemes adequately address how to achieve this. An
improved international standard must contemplate what benefits would be feasible
and also enhance the protection of vulnerable communities. Effecting feasible and
fair benefits involves looking beyond what the various international standards
suggest. An improved international standard should require researchers to develop
a research plan that specifies how the identified vulnerable population will benefit
from the research.
D. Enforceability
The Code, Declaration, and Guidelines do not impose legally enforceable
obligations on states or individuals.188 The three standards do, however, carry
persuasive weight in regulating doctors and finding liability.' 89  Unfortunately,
these standards may lack efficacy even as persuasive weight, because they remain
inconsistent. Furthermore, the Code and the Declaration lack specificity, and
researchers may consequently use their interpretive skills to extract a loose
standard. Enforceability, though a lofty goal in the international context, would
allow for more accountability in the arena of international human experimentation.
Researchers would be more likely to construct and conduct medical trials that
conform more precisely to articulated safeguards intended to protect human
subjects.
The Code does not even address the need for supervision of experimental
research; it never mentions IRBs or any other entity to provide oversight. The
Declaration also does not provide a legal standard of enforcement for its
provisions. Although the Declaration does assume that ethical oversight
committees will supervise experimental research, this is not always feasible.1
90
Often, developing countries will lack the ability and resources to maintain ethical
oversight committees.' Furthermore, because the Declaration is primarily
interested in protecting doctors and not patients,' 92 enforcement is not emphasized.
As one scholar put it, "[b]ecause of its one-sided approach to regulation, the
188. International Summit Conference on Bioethics, Towards an International Ethic for Research
with Human Beings 39 (1987).
189. Carr, supra note 112, at 47-48.
190. Id. at 45.
191. Id. at 45-46.
192. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Declaration does not provide adequate legal guidance to companies, but more
closely resembles a field manual for procedural policy.'
193
The Guidelines are similarly unhelpful in terms of enforcement. Like the
Declaration, the Guidelines use ethical review committees to supervise human
experimentation. 94 These ethical review committees generally do not have the
power to impose sanctions for violations by researchers. 95 They are allowed,
however, to deem a research project unethical and withdraw approval. 96 The
ethical review committee is also required to report violations to local or national
governments or enforcement agencies. 197 Ultimately, the Guidelines, like the Code
and the Declaration, lack any significant enforcement features. None of the
standards have the authority of binding international law.'
98
Not all of the international standards lack enforceability. The ICCPR, the
sparsest of all the standards, is enforceable. Under Article 2, all parties to the
covenant must adopt laws to give effect to the rights recognized in the ICCPR.' 99
Furthermore, Article 2 obliges all parties to ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms are violated has an effective remedy.200 However, the ICCPR, as it is,
does not provide adequate requirements and procedures for medical testing.
Rather, it contains only a basic statement requiring consent.201
An improved international standard should contain comprehensive procedural
requirements and be enforceable. Amending the ICCPR to require more than basic
consent to medical testing would be an improvement. However, efforts at
enforcement should not cease at the ICCPR and may require more creativity. For
instance, domestic policies and regulations also provide opportunity for
improvement. Additionally, the pressure of publicity, positive or negative, may
encourage improvement in international practices.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the Abdullahi case and the AZT experiments illustrate, 20 2 the current
governing mechanisms do not provide the necessary protections to vulnerable
193. Carr, supra note 112, at 47.
194. Guidelines, supra note 73, at 24.
195. Id. at 29.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Carr, supra note 112, at 48.
199. ICCPR, supra note 69, at 173-74.
200. Id. at 174.
201. Id. at 175 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation.").
202. See discussion, supra Part I.
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populations. An improved international standard would revise the informed
consent standard, adequately define vulnerable populations, and ensure that
appropriate benefits accrue to the vulnerable population. Ideally, the international
community should convene a convention addressing the protection of human
subjects, which would result in an enforceable treaty. Recognizing the limited
feasibility of this suggestion, this Part also considers other international and
domestic efforts that would improve the current trends in international human
experimentation. Internationally, the ICCPR could be amended to include more
detailed human experimentation provisions. Domestically, FDA and HHS
regulators should require more from researchers in order to ensure that patients are
informed, vulnerable populations are identified, and benefits are appropriately
allocated.
The first step in creating an international standard requires a recognition that
informed consent practices must be improved. Some of the most troubling facts of
the Abdullahi case were the glaring violations of informed consent.20 3 Most
participants could not speak English, did not know that they could refuse, and did
not know they could receive treatment from MSF.2 °4 An informed consent
standard must ensure that the participants understand that the treatment is
experimental. This means that a consent form must be in the relevant language-
or that there be a translator (and a witness). It also requires that the patients know
that they have the right to stop treatment and that other treatments are available.
These elements of informed consent are not new, as the examination of the
various standards demonstrated. Informed consent standards, however, must adapt
to the appropriate context. For instance, when Pfizer researchers sought consent
from subjects in Nigeria, part of the consent should have involved disclosing that
there was available treatment from charitable organizations. An international
standard must also be flexible enough to account for different traditions and
customs of consent. Specifically, if it is the tradition of the community that certain
leaders consent on behalf of the population, informed consent standards should
recognize that custom. The consent standard must not, however, become so
flexible as to forgo obtaining individual consent. Even where community consent
is given, researchers should still seek individual consent.
Furthermore, an international standard cannot ignore the reality that patients
in vulnerable populations will be more willing to consent to potentially inadvisable
research participation. In order to prevent exploitation, an international standard
should define "vulnerable populations" and have specific requirements to address
their needs. For the purposes of an international standard, a vulnerable population
should be defined as an economically disadvantaged community that lacks
adequate access to health care and political power. This definition is broader than
203. Supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
204. Supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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the one in the Guidelines. 20 5 Central to this recommended definition is the lack of
access to adequate health care. Within this definition of a vulnerable population
there should be subcategories for those who are legally or otherwise incompetent
or unable to provide the necessary consent and the appropriate measures of
protection for these groups.
The specific requirements regarding vulnerable populations should expand
beyond the reasonable access approach of the Guidelines and recognize other
benefits of research as identified by the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of
Research in Developing Countries.0 6 These benefits include the training of health
care or research personnel, construction of health care facilities and other physical
infrastructure, and provision of public health measures. 207 The international
standard should involve consulting with the particular community to determine
what would best benefit the population.
Acknowledging that there may be feasibility issues attached to an improved
and enforceable international standard, there are other efforts that could improve
current practices. The ICCPR, the only enforceable international standard, should
be amended to expand on its basic "free consent" requirement. 208 Article 7 could
be amended to provide populations with the right to benefit from experiments in
which they participate. There should also be domestic efforts at improved
regulation. Any company seeking to market a new drug must secure FDA
approval.2 0 9 The FDA should, as part of its approval process, require notification
of whether the tested human subjects comprise a vulnerable population. If so, the
FDA should then require documentation concerning how the researchers intend to
confer benefits on the population. The FDA should create a list of accepted
benefits, ranging from the improvement of a health care infrastructure (physical
improvement or otherwise), to the provision of the Phase IlI drugs (if
applicable/successful), to the provision of other public health services.210
Additionally, medical literature is capable of improving international testing
practices. Selected medical journals already require pharmaceutical companies to
205. The commentary on Guideline 13 defines vulnerable persons as "those who are relatively (or
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient
power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own
interests." Guidelines, supra note 73 at 64.
206. Fair Benefits, supra note 3, at 2133-34.
207. Id. at 2134.
208. See ICCPR, supra note 69, at 175.
209. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314-314.65 (2005).
210. The FDA is not the only government body that can adopt such policies. NIH, although it is not
a regulatory agency, does provide federal grants to researchers in academic and medical research
centers for scientific purposes. See http://www.nih.gov/aboutbudget.htm. NIH could require that grant
recipients conducting medical research on vulnerable populations demonstrate how they will confer
benefits to the community. See NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NIH BUDGET, http://www.nih.gov/
aboutlbudget.htm.
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register clinical trials for their reports to be considered for publication. 21 1
Furthermore, publications such as the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) require disclosure and reporting of authors' financial conflicts
of interest.212 Similarly, medical journals should require disclosure and report on
the benefits researchers provide to vulnerable communities.
CONCLUSION
The current standards guiding human experimentation in developing
countries are not preventing the exploitation of vulnerable populations. The Code
and the Declaration are too one-sided to be effective. The Guidelines do not fully
contemplate or consider the range of vulnerable populations. None of the
standards address the various tangible benefits that researchers could be required to
supply to vulnerable populations. An improved international standard must
consider these elements and effectively balance the various interests involved.
This standard would improve upon the current Guidelines by requiring appropriate
recognition of vulnerable populations and specific benefits to be bestowed upon
the tested population. Benefits should no longer be limited to successful Phase III
trials, but rather should ecompass a range of possibilities. Assuring that benefits
accrue to the vulnerable population will help ensure that the power equation is
balanced, with both sides profiting from medical progress.
211. Howard L. Dorfman & Linda Pissott Reig, Avoiding Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of Industry-
Sponsored Research: The Co-Existence of Research, Scholarship, and Marketing in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 595, 601 (2004).
212. Id. at 609.
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